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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred In Granting Rios' Motion To Suppress Test Results Of
The Blood Draw Obtained Following Rios' Arrest For Vehicular Manslaughter
And Leaving The Scene Of An Accident

A

Introduction
The district court erred when it concluded that Rios' failure to sign an

evidentiary testing consent form following his arrest for driving under the
influence constituted a per se revocation of his implied consent to submit to
evidentiary testing. (See generally Appellant's brief.) In response, Rios argues
that statutory implied consent cannot satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and that the state was thus required to
demonstrate that Rios "actually" consented to the testing prior to

the

administration of the blood draw. (See generally Respondent's brief.) A review
of the record and relevant case law reveals that Rios' argument fails and that the
district court erred.
B.

Revocable Implied Consent Satisfies The Consent Exception To The
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and

seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).

"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Consent is a valid
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

Schneckloth v.

Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Implied consent is statutorily provided
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for by Idaho Code § 18-8002.

"Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to

evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." State v. Wulff, 157
Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014).

However, "[i]nherent in the

requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that
consent." State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014).
In his Respondent's brief, Rios contends that a warrantless blood draw
cannot be justified by implied consent alone.

(Respondent's brief, pp.12-20

(citing Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582; Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339
P.3d at 371; State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773,774,339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014)).
However, a review of the cases relied upon by Rios reveals that revocable
implied consent satisfies the warrant exception of the Fourth Amendment.
In State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, _ , 355 P.3d 644, 653-655 (2015), the
Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed recent Idaho Supreme Court cases which
considered the application of the implied consent statute. In Smith, the parties
stipulated that the DUI suspect "didn't consent to the blood draw." Smith, 159
Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 655. In other words, there was no indication that the
state presented evidence that Smith provided "additional" or "actual" consent, in
addition to his statutorily implied consent, at the time of the evidentiary testing.
Still, relying on the continuing validity of revocable implied consent, the Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's motion to
suppress.

1st

To reach this conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed Wulff,
Halseth, and Arrotta and concluded that these Idaho Supreme Court cases did
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not stand for the proposition that statutorily implied consent was rendered invalid
by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), and instead, that "these
decisions lead to the conclusion that Idaho's law regarding statutorily implied
consent retains validity, but that consent may be terminated by a defendant's
refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing." Smith, 159 Idaho
at_, 355 P.3d at 655.
The Court of Appeals explained:
In Wulff, our Supreme Court held that the district court
"properly concluded that Idaho's implied consent statute was not a
valid exception to the warrant requirement." Wulff, 157 Idaho at
423, 337 P.3d at 582. At first glance, this holding would appear to
preclude the State from continuing to rely on the implied consent
statute to provide the requisite consent for a warrantless blood
draw in a suspected DUI case.
However, in addressing the
constitutionality of the statute, the Wulff Court made a salient
distinction. It identified "two hurdles" the statutory consent must
overcome to "qualify as voluntary: (1) drivers give their initial
consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to give voluntary
consent." Id. The Court considered that the first hurdle was met by
the statute: "Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary
testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." Id. (emphasis
added) (citing [State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739,
742 (2007)]. It was the second hurdle the court found problematic,
noting that Idaho appellate decisions interpreting section 18-8002
had held that a person could not revoke his statutorily implied
consent. "Because Idaho does not recognize a driver's right to
revoke his implied consent," the Court held, "Idaho has a per se
exception to the warrant requirement." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423,
337 P.3d at 582. Thus, the Court held, it was overruling previous
case law "to the extent that they applied Idaho's implied consent
statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed
forced warrantless blood draws." Id.
That Idaho's implied consent statute continues to be valid,
albeit in a form that is revocable, is supported by two subsequent
cases issued by our Supreme Court. Approximately one month
3

after Wulff, the Court decided Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d
368, holding:
[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's does
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who
refuses to consent ... or objects to the blood draw ....
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary
is the right of the person to withdraw that consent.
Id. at 646, 339 P.3d at 371. Then, several weeks later in State v.
Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014), the Court
cited to Wulff and Halseth for the proposition that "a suspect can
withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the
presence of alcohol."

Smith, 159 Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 654-655. (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, it is the revocability of statutorily implied consent that permits the
continued validity of such statutes after McNeely. Therefore, until a DUI suspect
affirmatively revokes his implied consent, that implied consent satisfies the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

In such an

instance, the state is not required to make any showing of additional or "actual"
consent.
The only authority Rios cites to that directly stands for the proposition he
sets forth in his Respondent's brief is a dissent from an Idaho Court of Appeals
opinion.

In Bobeck v. Idaho Transportation Department, 2015 WL 5602964

(Idaho App., September 24, 2015), a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed a
decision of the Transportation Department suspending Bobeck's driver's license
following a warrantless blood draw.

The majority concluded that statutorily

implied consent satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement even where Bobeck was "allegedly unconscious" at the time
of the blood draw, and thus did not, and could not, affirmatively resist or object to
4

the evidentiary testing.

lsi

at *4-6. In dissent, Judge Gutierrez disagreed with

the majority and concluded that "statutory implied consent is insufficient to satisfy
the consent exception to the warrant requirement," and that the "consent
exception requires actual consent."

lsi at *6-7.

Under the proposition set forth by Rios, and the dissent in Bobeck,
statutory implied consent would be of no effect. This would be contrary to the
language of McNeely and the aforementioned Idaho Supreme Court cases which
have acknowledged the continuing validity of revocable implied consent.

In

McNeely, the United States Supreme Court specifically recognized the validity of
implied consent laws as one of the "legal tools" available to states "to enforce
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566; see also
State v. Okken, 2015 WL 8159473, at *5 n. 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) ("Numerous
jurisdictions have addressed McNeely challenges to their implied consent
statutes. Contrary to Defendant's contention, our conclusion conforms with the
national view. Statutes that create revocable consent have uniformly been held
constitutional, even where refusal carries criminal penalties." (citing United States
v. Sugiyama, 2015 WL 4092494, at *4-10 (D. Md. 2015)); People v. Agnew,
2015 WL 7294822, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) ("Under the implied consent law,
moreover, a motorist consents in advance to testing if arrested for driving under
the influence, and the issue is then whether the arrested motorist withdraws that
consent by refusing to test.").
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Revocable statutorily implied consent satisfies the consent exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Therefore, Rios consented to the
warrantless blood draw unless he affirmatively revoked this consent. The state
was not required to provide evidence that Rios provided additional, "actual"
consent at the time of the evidentiary testing.

C.

The District Court Erred In Determining That Rios Revoked His Implied
Consent
The state additionally argues that the district court erred in determining

that Rios effectively revoked his implied consent before the warrantless blood
draw. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-12.) Because Rios has primarily argued that
statutorily implied consent cannot satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, the state relies on the arguments from its
Appellant's brief for these propositions.
However, the state disagrees with one of Rios' characterizations of the
state's argument. Rios argued that the state "proposes this Court create a rule
that in order to effectively revoke or withdraw one[']s implied consent, such
revocation must be done by physical force or otherwise unpeaceful behavior."
(Respondent's brief, pp.20-21.)

The state has proposed no such rule.

In its

Appellant's brief, the state specifically argued that the district court's expressed
belief that Idaho law did not require a driver to "physically resist a blood draw" did
not compel its conclusion in this case, because there was no evidence in the
record that Rios even verbally objected to the blood draw.
p.10 n.3.)

(Appellant's brief,

Further, numerous Idaho appellate opinions have recognized a DUI
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suspect's verbal revocation of his statutorily implied consent.

See Wulff, 157

Idaho at 417, 337 P. 3d at 576 (defendant refused breath test and became
uncooperative during the blood draw telling the nurse "you're not touching me");
Arrotta, 157 Idaho at 773-774, 339 P.3d at 1177-1178 (defendant refused the
breath test and asked if he could refuse the blood test); Halseth, 157 Idaho at
644, 339 P. 3d at 369 (the defendant protested a warrantless blood draw, stating
"You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you just take it without
permission?"). A DUI suspect may physically or verbally revoke his statutorily
implied consent to evidentiary testing. In this case, as the state has previously
argued, the district court erred by failing to analyze the totality of the
circumstances surrounding whether Rios affirmatively and effectively revoked his
implied consent in such a manner.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing the test results of the blood draw and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of December, 2015

MARK W. OLSON

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of December, 2015, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be placed in
United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
P. THOMAS CLARK
CLARK & FEENEY, LLP
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MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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